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llTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 19014

-v-

lCISf; llE-JESUS,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, -Jose De-Jesus, was charged with aggravated
robte ry, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann.
§

76-6-302 (1978).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After a jury trial on -January 17 and 18, 1983 in the
Third -Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, -Judge, presiding, appellant was
found guilty of aggravated robbery.

Appellant was sentenced

tu the Utah state Prison for a term of not less than five
years to life and fined $1000.00.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judyrnent and sentence of the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
on the afternoon of May 3, 1QR2, Miriam Davis
her daughter, Shauna, were working in Fankhauswer Jewelry,
store in Salt Lake City (T. 14-15, 60-61).

Appellant anc1

t

male companions appeared outside the store and looked in
through the window (T. 23-25, 64).

As the men entered the

store, appellant pulled a shotgun from underneath his coat,
pointed it at Miriam Davis, and exclaimed, "This is a holdup"
(T. 26, 66-67).

After asking where the "big diamonds" were,

appellant ordered Miriam and a customer to lie down on the
floor and then directed Shauna to unlock several showcases so
that his companions could remove the merchandise (T. 26,

67-69).

Appellant also forced Shauna to show him where the

cash drawer was (T. 67, 80).

The robbers remained in the

store for approximately ten minutes and then left (T.

29).

Shortly thereafter, police responded to a silent
alarm triggered when appellant and his accomplices entered the
store (T.

29).

A large amount of merchandise and the contents

of the cash drawer had been taken (T.

30-32).

The police

recovered from several of the display counters latent
palmprints and fingerprints that matched appellant's (T.

87-88, 107-110).

Three days after the robbery, Miriam Davis

identified appellant
At trial,

in a photo lineup (T.

45,

58).

both Miriam and Shauna Davis positively

identified appellant as the man armed with a shotgun who
entered the jewelry store and robbed it (T. 26-26, 66).
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t.n

1•1Pnce

establish an alibi, appellant
an

introduced into

airline ticket allegedly purchased by appellant in

""k \ity two weeks after the robt:ery occurred (T.
182-183).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE VERDICT.
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting a conviction, this Court has applied
the following standard of review:
This Court will not lightly overturn the
findings of a jury.
We must view the
evidence properly presented at trial in
the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, and will only interfere when the
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial
that a reasonable man could not possibly
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt.
We also view in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict those
facts which can be reasonably inferred
from the evidence presented to it.
State v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982)

(citations

omitted) .
Appellant's contention that the evidence was
insufficient as a matter of law to support the verdict is
entirely without merit.

He claims that the evidence he

presented with respect to an airline ticket purchased in New
Y-,rk City on May 17,

1982, two weeks after the robbery, must

-3-

have raised a reasonable doubt as to his presenct'
City on May 3, 1982, the date of the rr>bbery.

in salt

This

1 ,lf,

ar'Jllnh'"'

is based on two erroneous assurnµtions -- ( 1) that the cvi•J<,, 1
established that the airline ticket was actually purchased tiy
appellant, and

( 2) that the evidence of the purchase

eliminated the possibility that appellant was in Salt Lake
City on May 3.

A representative of United Airlines, the

airline that sold the ticket, testified that the ticket was
issued to an "I." or "J." DeJesus and that there was no way of
knowing whether it was actually issued to appellant (T.
182-183, 188).

Moreover, even if appellant did purchase the

ticket on May 17, that certainly did not preclude his presence
in Salt Lake City on May 3.

The trier of fact simply was was

not obligated to believe the evidence most favorable to
appellant rather than that presented in opposition by the
State; and the existence of contradictory evidence or of
conflicting inferences does not warrant upsetting the verdict.
State v. Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982).
The positive in-court

identification of appellant as

the robber by the two victims and the photo lineup
identification of appellant

by one of the victims, coupled

with the recovery of appellant's palmprints and fingerprints
at the scene of the crime, constituted sufficient evidence to
support a finding
in the

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant

jewelry store on the date in question and that he
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W0 '

the crime charyed.
1 iri•J
1

The evidence simply was not so

and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not

,s·,Jt>ly have found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable

duu ht.

POINT I I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION ON
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION.
Appellant's requested jury instruction on eyewitness
identification (R. 59-61)

is modeled after that recommended in

United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
This Court has repeatedly held that a "Telfaire" instruction
is not mandatory in all instances where eyewitness
identification is crucial to the case.

Instead, the decision

of whether to give a Telfaire instruction is discretionary
with the trial court.

See State v. Bingham, Utah,

P.2d_

No. 18774 (decided June 13, 1984); State v. Reedy, Utah, 681
P.2d 1251 (1984); State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982).
As noted

in Bingham:
Jury instructions must be considered as a
whole.
"When taken as a whole if they
fairly tender the case to the jury, the
fact that one or more of the instructions,
standing alone, are not as full or
accurate as they might have been is not
reversible error."
State v. Brooks, Utah,
638 P.2d 537, 542 (1981) (citation
omitted).

Slip op. at p.

3.
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The trial court's instructions
(see, particularly, Instructions No.

ir1

appellant's

1 and 7 (R. h7,

fully informed the jury that the State had the

Crlcec

71J))

burden ot

proving every element of the offense charged beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Instruction No.

10 (R.

73)

instructed

t1

1..

jurors that they were the sole judges of the credibility o[
the witnesses and set forth specific guidelines for
determining a witness's credibility.

As in Bingham,

the

instruct ions, taken as a whole, "adequately advised the jury
on the law pertaining to this case."

Bingham, slip op.

4, citing State v. Schaffer, Utah, 638 P.2d 1185, 1187 (1981).
Significantly, two eyewitnesses (i.e., Miriam and Shauna
Davis) positively identified appellant as the robter; and
there was additional physical evidence linking appellant to
the crime (i.e., appellant's palmprints and fingerprints found
at the scene of the crime).
the kind of case identified

Thus,

this does not appear to be

by Justice Durham in her

concurring opinion in State v. Newton, Utah, 681 P.2d 833
(1984), where "an instruction on the dangers of eyewitness
identification is most appropriate."

-6-

681 P.2d at 834.

CONCLUSION
The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to
'i'l""'t
1rt's
ihP

the

jury's guilty verdict.

Further, based on this

recent decisions concerning "Telfaire" instructions,

trial court's refusal to give appellant's requested
identification instruction to the jury was not

error.

Therefore, the judgment of the trial court should be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY subnitted this

-cc-

day of August,

19 84 .

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General
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